Senate Bill Colored as a Civil Rights Issue, Ultimately Revamped

The Case

As the nation turned its focus toward the impending presidential primaries last summer, Washington dealmakers had other political hot potatoes to juggle. In April 1999, Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Phil Gramm (R-Texas) launched an attempt to dramatically weaken the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) - a law he considered synonymous with big government. The CRA, which was enacted in 1977,
gives banks and thrifts incentives to lend money in urban and rural areas that might otherwise be overlooked as places worthy of investment dollars. PolicyLink, a nonprofit advocacy organization
dedicated to achieving social and economic equity, feared that Gramm's provisions in the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 would signal the demise of the CRA. The organization hired Porter
Novelli Washington to launch a campaign to save the CRA.

Educating, Not Lobbying

Because PolicyLink is a nonprofit, and therefore not permitted to lobby, there were strict guidelines governing campaign strategy. (For example, messages emanating from PolicyLink could not attack
Sen. Gramm directly.) Porter Novelli sought to promote the benefits of CRA by funneling educational messages through the media and key influentials.

"The CRA allows more inner city people to get mortgages, and nothing stabilizes neighborhoods better than home ownership," says Mike Frisby, VP of public affairs for Porter Novelli, echoing one of the
campaign's main points. "CRA also allows [inner city and rural] businesses and entrepreneurs to flourish, and helps with economic development and revitalization in these areas."

Campaign initiatives were designed to remind legislators that the CRA is supported by groups that influence voters - including the civil rights community, civic leaders and neighborhood activists.

Friends & Allies

Porter Novelli pushed for press coverage as a means of highlighting strong support of the CRA, and raising questions about who would benefit if the CRA was weakened.

Just prior to the Senate vote on Gramm's bill, the agency staged a May press conference in the lobby of the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW) building in DC, featuring comments by National Urban
League President Hugh Price, and Wade Henderson, executive director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Stories in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Boston Globe and other papers
subsequently questioned Gramm's motives for dismantling the CRA.

The agency also funneled fact sheets and success stories to newspaper editorial writers - a tactic that resulted in dozens of editorials beseeching Congress not to weaken the CRA. Meanwhile, op-ed
pieces authored by civil rights spokesmen such as Henderson and Cleveland Mayor Mike White were strategically placed in regional newspapers. Many of the same spokesmen were booked for radio interviews
around the country.

To keep the CRA issue top of mind among Washington insiders and key constituents, Porter Novelli crafted a targeted ad campaign that ran in various DC publications, the Washington edition of the Wall
Street Journal and hometown newspapers of certain congressional members. The agency also generated pro-CRA posters that members of Congress used during floor speeches to highlight CRA success stories in
their districts.

Law Review

In April 1999, pro-CRA groups' main concern was keeping Senate democrats on board to support the CRA during a committee vote. During the initial Senate vote, two republicans - James Jeffords (Vt.) and
Arlen Specter (Penn.) - voted against Gramm's original banking bill. Feedback from Hill staffers later indicated that the senators were concerned about being on the wrong side of a civil rights
issue.

In November, during crucial negotiations between the Clinton administration and Sen. Gramm (in which the president came close to signing the bill), the Porter Novelli team barraged fax machines at the
White House, congressional offices and federal agencies with a blast fax that read, "Clinton Administration Caving on CRA."

"I can't tell you exactly what happened over there, but by the end of the day, there was no deal," says Frisby. Two days later, White House negotiators had reworked a deal that was more supportive of
the CRA.

In January 2000 (after the revised bill had passed) PolicyLink distributed a six-page newsletter to legislators, community groups, the banking community and others, touting the bill's passage and
explaining the new law. Additional articles profiled American communities and real people who were benefiting from the CRA.

"In the end, we forced a compromise," says Frisby. "Not everybody was happy with the outcome. Sen. Gramm did manage to place new reporting guidelines on the CRA folks, which many CRA supporters
weren't happy about. But he didn't dismantle the CRA, whereas his original bill would have gutted it."

(Porter Novelli DC, Mike Frisby, VP public affairs; Traci Otey Blunt, account executive, 202/973-5806)

Political Safeguard?

Civil rights leaders remained committed to the CRA cause after Gramm's initial legislative proposal was revised. During the Senate mark-up of the final bill, Jesse Jackson
held a press conference at the National Press Club, and then headed up to the Hill to observe the hearing. Sen. Gramm paused the proceedings to meet privately with Jackson.

Inside Porter Novelli Washington

Founded: 1972
Employees: 500 in the U.S.; 150 in Washington
1999 Revenues (DC): $19.6 million
Clients: Propane Council, Steel Alliance, Gallup, Osteoporosis Campaign,
The Kellogg Co., Pfizer, National Institute of Mental Health, Centers for Disease
Control
Average times per week an agency staffer visits Capitol Hill: 2
Time frame for CRA campaign: April - December 1999
Budget for CRA campaign: $400,000