In late 1999, the U.S. government filed a multibillion-dollar
lawsuit against the major tobacco companies. It sought to recover
government healthcare costs and wrongful cigarette-company profits
produced by the industry's alleged history of misdeeds, including
its practice of marketing to children.
In September 2000, Judge Gladys Kessler ruled that the
government had valid legal claims and that the case should proceed.
In 2001, the Bush administration, with a track record of taking
major campaign money from the tobacco industry -- as well as a
history of less-than-supportive statements about the case - took
office. This had advocates at the National Center for Tobacco-Free
Kids worried. Would the new administration drop the lawsuit? It
sure looked that way. In April 2001, the administration failed to
provide the funding needed to continue the case and instead
announced that the lawsuit was under review.
At that point, the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids swung
into action with a PR campaign called "Don't Pardon Big Tobacco."
The goal was to keep the lawsuit high on the radar screen among
healthcare groups, government watchdog groups, the media and,
ultimately, the government agencies responsible for pursuing the
case.
The message would be one of not-so-subtle accusation. The
nonprofit group would point out the millions of dollars in
tobacco-industry campaign contributions accepted by the
administration, and would further allege that a failure to pursue
the case represented a straightforward quid pro quo for that
campaign funding. "We sought to define any negative actions by the
administration or Congress as payback for the millions in campaign
contributions that the industry had given," says Vince Willmore the
center's Communications Director.
The PR campaign would move on several fronts. Primarily, the
campaign would disseminate basic information to key media outlets,
along with detailed research findings, followed by an aggressive
media campaign of press releases and briefings with journalists.
The center would also coordinate a Web-related grass roots effort
to centralize public discontent with the administration's policies
on the issue. Paid advertising would echo the campaign's themes.
"It was a full court press," says Willmore.
In December 2000, in advance of Congressional hearings, the PR
team sent out information on the campaign-contributions issue as it
related to two key presidential nominees, Attorney General John
Ashcroft and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson. These
materials help spark stories in The New York Times, The Washington
Post, Time and other publications, that highlighted the
administration's ties to tobacco.
A month later, the PR team followed up with the first of four
advertisements in major national publications, again tying campaign
contributions to the administration's pro- tobacco stance.
The PR team joined forces with Common Cause, the American Heart
Association and the American Lung Association to produce a major
research report, "Buying Influence, Selling Death: How Big
Tobacco's Campaign Contributions Harm Public Health." The report
was distributed to the media as well as members of Congress.
In April 2001, when it appeared the administration didn't intend
to fully fund the lawsuit, the PR team put out a press release and
an editorial board memo, in conjunction with more paid
advertising.
The center routinely writes to the editorial boards of the major
dailies nationwide, in memos distributed through U.S. Newswire. In
this case the memo argued that the lawsuit should be fully funded
so that the case could be decided in a court of law. It also
reiterated the issue of campaign contributions.
Ads ran in major dailies and also influential Washington, D.C.
publications such as Roll Call, The Hill and The Washington Times.
(The primary audience for these was Congress and the
administration.) Total ad budget was $1.1 million. Ad agency GMMB
did the creative, in close cooperation with the PR team.
Next, the grass-roots portion of the campaign kicked into gear,
with the launch of DontPardonBigTobacco.org, a call to action Web
site that encouraged citizens to contact President Bush on the
subject of the lawsuit. Visitors could fax the administration
directly from the Web site, and could also register to be part of a
grass-roots movement in support of the lawsuit. "We used the site
both to the show the administration that the lawsuit had strong
grassroots support, and also to recruit new champions, people we
could go to when issues arose who we knew could be counted on to
contact their representatives," says Willmore.
With the heat on, the administration then said it might settle
the lawsuit. But the PR campaign rolled on, pushing for full
prosecution of the case. Press releases called any potential
settlement a "sweetheart deal" meant to reward campaign
contributions, while paid advertising echoed the theme. By the fall
of 2001, it appeared that the tide was turning.
Turning the tables
PR's greatest challenge in the battle against Big Tobacco was
the David-and-Goliath aspect of the clash. Compared to the
nonprofit group, the tobacco industry had virtually unlimited money
and power. However, to overcome this obstacle, the PR team turned
the tables, using the industry's strength against it with
accusations of influence peddling. In that sense, the more the
tobacco industry spent in Washington, the stronger the anti-tobacco
message would become. "While our testing showed that the public
supports the pursuit of this lawsuit, we found that people were
outraged when you tied together any effort to kill the lawsuit with
campaign contributions. That was a very strong combination," says
Willmore.
This refers to a poll conducted on behalf of the center by
Market Facts Tele Nation in July 2000. It showed that a majority of
respondents would be more likely to vote for a candidate who took
no tobacco money and who voted to allow the lawsuit, that they
would for a candidate who took money from the tobacco industry and
voted to prevent the lawsuit.
Outcomes
The PR strategy of framing the issue as payback for campaign
contributions did indeed resonate. The New York Times, USA Today,
The Washington Post and many other media outlets published
editorials in support of pursuing the lawsuit. Six political
cartoons ran in major daily papers around the country, satirizing
the tobacco industry's campaign contributions.
The grass roots Web site garnered coverage from MCNBC, USA
Today's Hot Site of the Day and other web sites. More that 38,000
people visited the web site, sending a total of 29,406 faxes to
President Bush in 2001.
By the end of 2001 the administration had dome a 180 degree
turn, and announced that it would fully fund the lawsuit. Fast
forward to March of this year, as the Justice Department issued its
strongest indication yet that it intended to move forward seriously
with the case. Citing new evidence, the department demanded that
the tobacco industry fork over $289 billion in profits derived from
a half-century of "fraudulent" and dangerous marketing practices.
This marked the first time the government had put a dollar figure
on what it believes should be forfeited.
Willmore says the campaign's multi-pronged strategy was in large
degree responsible for its success. "We needed to demonstrate to
the administration and to other elected offices that we had a
message that resonated no only with the media, but with concerned
Americans in general, and that people would be willing to take
action on the issue," he says.
Lessons Learned
In its recent efforts to influence tobacco policy, the National
Center for Tobacco-Free Kids learned a number of important
lessons...
Start early: "One of the key lessons learned is that you need to
set the stage early in delivering your message. When the
administration or Congress takes an action that you oppose, it is
much more effective if you have already set the stage for
responding to it," says Vince Willmore, the center's Communications
Director. In this case the PR team presented information on
campaign contributions during John Ashcroft's confirmation
hearings. When the attorney general leter tried to kill funding for
an anti-tobacco lawsuit, "we linked the actions on the lawsuit to
payback for the tobacco industry's campaign contributions, and we
were very credible on that."
Get the facts right: The center has a reputation among editors
for always having the facts straight. "That is something we strive
to provide across the boards, and I think the credibility that the
organization has established over the years was very important" in
the campaign to keep the anti-tobacco lawsuit alive.
Hit 'em from all sides: "To win against a well-funded opponent,
you need to have a strong coordinated campaign that includes paid
media, earned media, effective grassroots work, and also effective
policy advocacy among elected officials," says Willmore. No one PR
tool is enough to get the job done.
Fast Facts on Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
- Year founded: 1995
- HQ: Washington, D.C.
- Budget (2002): $14.2 million
- Number of Employees: 50
- Campaign time frame: December 2000-
- December 2001
- Budget for campaign: $1.15 million, including $1.1 million for
print advertising and $50,000 for Web site development and
marketing - On the web: http://www.tobaccofreekids.org
- Staff on this campaign: Vince Willmore, Communications
Director; Michael Berman, Manager, Media Relations; Joel Spivak,
Assistant Manager, Media Relations; Allyson Kapin, Web Editor;
Laura Thomas, Advertising Associate; Carter Headrick, Manager,
Grassroots; Dean Nielsen, Assistant Manager, Grassroots
Contact: Vince Wilmore, 202.296.5469, [email protected]