In the heat of a crisis, it may be forgivable for PR
executives to think they are engaged in a life-and-death battle.
But for Joseph Sanchez, it was the real deal. Sanchez, a National
Guard member since 1994, returned to the United States in February
after serving for a year as the international and local
media-relations coordinator for Task Force Olympia, the command and
control center in northern Iraq. Sanchez now is back at his
civilian job, heading PR for industrial manufacturer Metropolitan
Industries (Romeoville, Ill.), where he worked before deploying
with the military following the Sept. 11 attacks. Sanchez now
shares some of his experiences on conducting PR and communications
amid such a hairy environment. Asked how his type of PR lessons
could possibly apply to marketing-communications professionals
stateside, Sanchez says, "You would be surprised."
The sound of incoming mortar or rocket fire, the threat of
roadside bombs or the possibility of a sniper attack usually does
not interfere with day-to-day PR operations in companies across
America. However, in Iraq, the threat is very real and every PR
strategy or technique devised must take into account risk vs.
reward during operation planning. Nevertheless, there is a great
deal to be learned for PR professionals working in decidedly
less-hostile environments.
The game remains the same:
When I arrived in Iraq in February 2004, I found that the
military's PR operation was disorganized and needed repair. Freedom
and a sense of democracy brought many entrepreneurs into the world
of journalism, creating a vacuum as Iraq moved from
government-controlled newspapers to as many as 50 newspapers in
northern Iraq alone.
The military was behind the "eight ball" in terms of knowing who
the new journalists were along with their opinions, attitudes and
audience demographics of their product. In the beginning, I stuck
to the basics: researching and learning about media and public
opinion through media analysis and eventually one-on-one meetings
with every editor of every media outlet in northern Iraq, including
radio and television.
Before long, the military's PR operation was up and running, and
a steady flow of communication began transpiring between the
military and the local media on a daily basis due to clear-cut and
straightforward PR tactics.
Soon, media escorts were required at all special events,
including school openings and clinic openings. Most press releases
appeared in all the local papers or they were read on radio or they
were turned into a news story on television.
Communication is the No. 1 weapon:
Whether you are working PR in a war zone like Iraq, for a big
firm in Chicago or anywhere in the world, communication and
interpersonal relationships with the conduits that deliver your
message -- i.e., the media -- are among the most important aspects
of tactics. They serve as the foundation of any complex and
long-term program. Relationships are what drive this industry, and
I focused most of my energy on building these relationships with
the local media.
Because of these efforts, many attempts by the insurgents to
submit damaging, anti-American propaganda to the media failed
because our relationship was stronger than the insurgents'
relationship.
You can blindly send out press releases day after day to a media
list composed from a media directory sitting on your desk, but if
you do not get out and meet the people on the other end of your
e-mails, then your results will be minimal.
Public opinion and tactics:
As the military's PR operation streamlined, I focused on public
opinion and bringing local citizens to action. I wanted to convince
ordinary Iraqis to work with members of their new government and
the Iraqi Security Forces while instilling a sense of pride in
their country.
Yet I soon found out that mainstream PR tactics would not be
enough to move the Iraqi people to this action because of the fear
and intimidation the insurgents provided daily.
Anyone suspected of working with the Multi-National Force
(MNF), Iraqi Security Forces or the new government was
killed or their families were killed. For months, I tried to
provoke the Iraqi people to take hold of their destiny through
various campaigns, with small successes that never lasted very
long.
It was not until two months before the historic election in Iraq
that I finally figured out the solution. I realized the two things
that really touch the nerves of Iraqi people are their children and
violence. I wanted to make a big push before the election, so I
combined both children and violence into a media-blitz campaign
using every medium available in northern Iraq, including
billboards.
Working together with the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), I
devised a campaign that depicted joyful children looking forward to
the future, and I contrasted that with images of sheer violence and
destruction caused by the insurgents. At the end of every
commercial, newspaper ad or billboard, the tagline read: "Enough is
Enough. Tell the terrorists they are not wanted in your country on
30 January 2005."
This campaign not only struck a nerve with Iraqis but with the
insurgents, as well. They killed three of my billboard installers
as they worked on putting up my "Enough is Enough" billboards.
People working for IMN were threatened, and the headquarters
attacked with mortars and small arms fire, but the commercials kept
running. Just recently, they murdered an anchorwoman who heads the
news there. At election time, a strong turnout occurred in the
north, with people not hiding the fact that they voted. A big fear
of the military and speculation from international media was that
people would be too intimidated or scared to participate, but that
was not the case at all.
Since my return home, IMN has carried the torch, taking this
campaign to a new level with the introduction of a reality series
showing captured insurgents casually talking about killings,
beheadings, etc., of innocent people.
This new campaign, spawned from "Enough is Enough," has sparked
protests against the insurgents and reprisals from ordinary people
who now view the insurgents as thugs and gangsters rather than
heroes fighting against the occupiers.
Contact: Joseph Sanchez, [email protected]