Crisis in Kosovo Poses Challenges, Provides PR Lessons Too

The NATO bombings in Yugoslavia are an emotional and difficult issue for many people, given the terrible human cost of thousands of displaced Kosovars, "collateral damage" and three U.S. captives. The communications challenges that this conflict raises for the White House and NATO are complex and extensive, and it's crucial to have them clearly identified.

Within those challenges, however, are some lessons which apply to PR.

Challenge 1:

The public has shown skepticism over the White House's timing of previous bombing campaigns in Iraq and the Sudan. Pundits and critics quickly labeled them "Wag the Dog" efforts to take the focus off "Monicagate."

The story of Monica bit the dust, but public and media cynicism remains high. One recent editorial cartoon depicted President Clinton holding a news conference in which every question was about the Yugoslavian bombing, while The President asks, "Any questions about Monica"?

Challenge 2:

The Kosovo campaign is a difficult "sell" to the American public. Unlike the 1991 Persian Gulf "Desert Storm" campaign, there hasn't been a six month troop build-up to condition the public to the inevitability of the invasion.

There were no Presidential Christmas visits or nightly news "horror stories" to build public support for NATO intervention.

Following our most recent experiences of "surgical" bombings in Iraq and Sudan, the public had developed an expectation that the Yugoslavian bombing campaigns would end after a day or two. Victory could be declared and the fighter jets could return home. One recent newscaster called it the John Wayne Syndrome - go in, shoot 'em up, get out.

The average American can't find Kosovo on a map and has no real understanding of the Serbian conflict. So from the outset, it was an uphill battle to get the public riled up about Serbia.

Challenge 3

Milosevic repeatedly ignored NATO threats of military action, which created a credibility problem for NATO. The United States, Britain and other Western nations expended considerable effort to persuade, cajole and ultimately threaten Slobidan Milosevic into discontinuing his campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the ethnic-Albanian people, yet he clearly had no intention of stopping.

This impotence brought into question the credibility of the American government and of NATO's ability to enforce its demands. The line in the sand had been drawn and redrawn. Stealth bombers and cruise missiles were now inevitable.

Challenge 4

In international affairs, it is vital to win the "living room war." The famous dictum, "the first victim of war is the truth" has never been more apt than in the Yugoslav conflict.

According to most observers at the time, once the Vietnam War became a nightly television staple, opposition to America's continued involvement became more widespread. Since that time, governments engaged in armed conflict have expended considerable effort to shape media coverage of those events.

Once the NATO bombing campaign was underway, the battle for the hearts and minds of the American people heated up.

Daily coverage features bombing footage on the nightly news, including CNN live updates from Aviano, Italy and Belgrade. Network and newspaper coverage is marked by frequent references to the "dictator" Milosevic. Words like "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing," along with footage of refugees fleeing Kosovo, began to influence public opinion. Once talk of ground troops began to intensify, public support for ground troops began to increase.

Media coverage broadcast to citizens of NATO countries focused on refugees, while Serbian television focused on civilian "collateral" damage from the NATO bombs.

Capitalizing on the emotional power of television, Milosevic has ordered TV cameras to civilian bombing sites. NATO announced that the Belgrade television station itself would be a bomb target. NATO command obviously concluded that the key to destroying the resolve of the Serb population was to eliminate their access to television.

As with the marketplace and with issues of public policy, armed conflict requires strategic communications in order to succeed as well.

Barry J. McLaughlin is president of Barry McLoughlin Associates Inc. Strategic Communications Counsel, with offices in Washington, D.C., Princeton, N.J., and Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The Web site is http://www.mclomedia.com and McLoughlin can be reached by e-mail at [email protected]

Do you favor or oppose the United States being a part of that military action?
 
Favor Oppose No Opinion
99 Apr 13-14 61% 35% 4%
99 Apr 6-7 58 36 6
99 Mar 30-31 53 41 6
99 Mar 25 50 39 11
99 Mar 19-21* 46 43 11
99 Feb 19-21^ 43 45 12

* Question Wording: "If a peace agreement is not reached between the Yugoslavian Serbs and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, NATO has said it would carry out airand missile attacks against Serb military installations.Would you favor or oppose the U.S. being a part of that military action?"

Source: Gallup